Sleeper: domicile?

In New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987) The Supreme Court held that warrantless inspections of a commercial entity are permitted if the entity is part of a "closely regulated industry", is a "substantial government interest", the inspections are "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme', and the inspection provides "the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers."

That case did not involve the search of a truck-tractor sleeper berth. It involved the search of an automobile junk yard. The officers were checking for proper documentation of VINs to determine if vehicles were stolen. The Court framed the issues as follows:

1. ""[W]hether the warrentless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries."
2. "[W]hether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional because the ultimate purpose of the regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done . . . is the same as that of penal laws."

The Court that because junkyards are a "closely" regulated industry, the state has a "substantial interest in regulating" it because the threat of "motor theft", and "regulation of the . . . industry" can control "the receiver of, or market in, stolen property." That statute provides a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" by informing the operator "that inspections will be made on a regular basis."

The Court also held that "[a] State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions."

The Court found that an owner of a commercial business has a privacy interest,but that the administrative scheme is not "unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an inspecting officer may discover evidence of crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself....So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself."

In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a motorhome. It noted preliminarily that the Fourth Amendment provides the people have a protected privacy interest in their homes, persons and effects stating that "This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer." The Court noted that there are exceptions to this rule requiring a warrant, including the exception allowing warrantless searches of automobiles under some circumstances because "the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests." "Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." The Court also noted that there is a lesser degree of privacy required with respect to an automobile due to "the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." ...."In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly
used for residential purposes -- temporary or otherwise -- the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.".

[SUP] [/SUP]In holding that the warrantless search of a motor home does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court said the following:

The Court found that the fact that the motorhome was capable of being a residence was not sufficient to pull it out of the automobile exception to the requirement for a warrant before search, stating as follows:

If the issue of warrantless searches of sleeper berths ever reaches the Supreme Court I suspect it would hold such searches do not require warrantless because of the diminished expectation of privacy in a commercial vehicle, the fact that the vehicle is subject to heavy regulation, and the fact that the vehicles are mobile which, under such exigent circumstances justifies a warrantless search. Please note that there is still the requirement for probable cause. The Constitution does not prohibit warrantless searches. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

I do not necessarily agree with the Court's rationale in allowing such searches. This is simply my opinion with respect to whether a Court would permit the warrantless search of a sleeper berth.

Nothing in this post should be construed as creating an attorney-client relationship.

Paul Taylor
Attorney
www.truckersjusticecenter.com









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In New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987) The Supreme Court held that warrantless inspections of a commercial entity are permitted if the entity is part of a "closely regulated industry", is a "substantial government interest", the inspections are "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme', and the inspection provides "the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers."

That case did not involve the search of a truck-tractor sleeper berth. It involved the search of an automobile junk yard. The officers were checking for proper documentation of VINs to determine if vehicles were stolen. The Court framed the issues as follows:

1. ""[W]hether the warrentless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries."
2. "[W]hether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional because the ultimate purpose of the regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done . . . is the same as that of penal laws."

The Court that because junkyards are a "closely" regulated industry, the state has a "substantial interest in regulating" it because the threat of "motor theft", and "regulation of the . . . industry" can control "the receiver of, or market in, stolen property." That statute provides a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" by informing the operator "that inspections will be made on a regular basis."

The Court also held that "[a] State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions."

The Court found that an owner of a commercial business has a privacy interest,but that the administrative scheme is not "unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an inspecting officer may discover evidence of crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself....So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself."

In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a motorhome. It noted preliminarily that the Fourth Amendment provides the people have a protected privacy interest in their homes, persons and effects stating that "This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer." The Court noted that there are exceptions to this rule requiring a warrant, including the exception allowing warrantless searches of automobiles under some circumstances because "the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests." "Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." The Court also noted that there is a lesser degree of privacy required with respect to an automobile due to "the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." ...."In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly
used for residential purposes -- temporary or otherwise -- the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.".

In holding that the warrantless search of a motor home does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court said the following:

The Court found that the fact that the motorhome was capable of being a residence was not sufficient to pull it out of the automobile exception to the requirement for a warrant before search, stating as follows:

If the issue of warrantless searches of sleeper berths ever reaches the Supreme Court I suspect it would hold such searches do not require warrantless because of the diminished expectation of privacy in a commercial vehicle, the fact that the vehicle is subject to heavy regulation, and the fact that the vehicles are mobile which, under such exigent circumstances justifies a warrantless search. Please note that there is still the requirement for probable cause. The Constitution does not prohibit warrantless searches. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

I do not necessarily agree with the Court's rationale in allowing such searches. This is simply my opinion with respect to whether a Court would permit the warrantless search of a sleeper berth.

Nothing in this post should be construed as creating an attorney-client relationship.

Paul Taylor
Attorney
www.truckersjusticecenter.com



All
lawyers















Become an LII
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Sorry about the double post. I was trying to edit and messed up.

 

Last year Last year ol

 

Last year or so in OOIDA vs Minnesota a Federal judge ruled that the search standard for a Commercial Vehicle search was "articulable reasonable probable cause".

Also in an interview with Iowa Highway Patrol on Landline Now, OOIDAs radio show on XM/Sirius radio, an IHP spokesperson stated that during a DOT inspection the sleeper can be inspected for a proper bed, bedclothes and safety belt...during that inspection anything laying out in plain sight is "fair game".

To me that means tat during

 

If You feel safe without "protection" Do it. The world is different, adjust. Takes more than Pepper Spray to save your live sometimes. Can't fine a dead Driver. Just saying.